Home Security Systems

Snattlerake

Conservitum Americum
Special Hen
Joined
Jan 19, 2019
Messages
14,351
Reaction score
19,047
Location
OKC
Those cameras cover the house and barn. But we can see literally everything. Cause frigging bate thieves.
Hoping you have cameras covering cameras so if some are disabled, the other cameras will record the shenanigans.

Back to Simplisafe. The biggest problem I have with their stuff is it is not adaptable to external door contacts. I opened mine up and cut the hermetically sealed glass tube and soldered in the OVHD door contacts thereby voiding the warranty but I did get them to work.

Also having problems with a 3.5 volt button battery showing low voltage and missing door sensor at 3 volts. Ridiculous.
 

Snattlerake

Conservitum Americum
Special Hen
Joined
Jan 19, 2019
Messages
14,351
Reaction score
19,047
Location
OKC
For security cameras indoors, I like the simplisafe too, but outdoors their camera won't cut it. I like the Dahua IPC-HFW5442T-AS-LED. It has stellar night vision and it's very tough in the elements. It's hardwired though so you'll have to buy a bunch of cat 5/cat6 cable and run it out, but it's worth every penny.
Nice! This little camera has features we employed at great expense at airports 25 years ago with the new technology from Israel.
Nicevision. We could set up rules for people leaving bags unattended, artificial trip wires, wrong way movement, theft or moving of stationary objects, and hot swap RAID drives. The airport cop shops loved the NICE Vision system. Now, these cams have the tech embedded in the cam!
 

Newbie

Sharpshooter
Special Hen
Joined
Dec 17, 2008
Messages
309
Reaction score
420
Location
Edmond
For the "Simplisafe bypass" thing, they send you a text alert if there's interference detected for very long, I think it's 8-10 seconds. That lets you look on the cameras to see if creeps are creeping.

For the Echo "all my internet belongs to the community now, hahahaa!" setting, that's just another reason not to trust Ring added to the list. Thanks for posting!
 

SoonerP226

Sharpshooter
Special Hen
Joined
Jan 1, 2013
Messages
9,755
Reaction score
6,614
Location
Norman
For the Echo "all my internet belongs to the community now, hahahaa!" setting, that's just another reason not to trust Ring added to the list. Thanks for posting!
That's not really an accurate characterization of what it is, but you can turn it off in the settings in the Ring app. IMHO, it should be off by default, but most "journalists" are doing about as good of a job of describing it as they do covering anything firearms-related.
 

Jim Parry

Marksman
Supporting Member
Special Hen Supporter
Joined
Jan 15, 2021
Messages
26
Reaction score
14
Location
Ponca City, OK
You might look into Abode as well. It’s a low cost option and gives you the ability to self-monitor or pay for professional monitoring. (You can even switch between the monitoring options each month). We’ve been pleased with it.
 

SoonerP226

Sharpshooter
Special Hen
Joined
Jan 1, 2013
Messages
9,755
Reaction score
6,614
Location
Norman
FWIW, Wyze has been in the tech press recently, and not for something good. Here's a reasonably good explanation of the situation from Steve Gibson on the Security Now podcast:
Okay. I titled this "Not So Wyze." One week ago, last Tuesday, Bitdefender published the results of their close examination of the very popular Wyze family of security and surveillance-oriented Internet-connected webcams. And it will surprise no one to learn that they found problems, nor that the problems were extremely critical given the application these webcams are typically deployed for. Right? I mean, they're being sold as let's use this for security. And as I said at the top of the show, I utterly love the details, and our listeners will, too, and you will, Leo, of the authentication bypass that Bitdefender found, which I'll describe in a minute.

The most distressing part of the story, well, the equally distressing part of the story, is the fact that the Bitdefender group has been working with Wyze, or perhaps better stated "attempting to work with Wyze" for three years to get these three critical problems which they uncovered resolved. Back on March 6th of 2019, Bitdefender made first contact with Wyze and asked for a PGP key via their support form. You know, and as we know, that's standard practice now. You ask a vendor for a PGP key which will allow you to securely communicate with them, which involves the disclosure of potentially extremely sensitive details that they don't want exposed any more than the discoverer wants them exposed. No response.

They waited a week. On March 15th, 2019, three years ago, a little more now, Bitdefender made a second attempt at getting in touch with the vendor, still no response. Apparently unrelated, on April 22nd, Wyze released an update for Wyze Cam v2 to v4.9.4.37, which reduced the risk for unauthenticated access to the contents of the SD card that the camera might have. But still no contact with Bitdefender's research team. So this looks like it was just coincidental.

The next day, 4.10.3.50 was released for Wyze Cam Pan v1 with the same risk reduction for unauthenticated access to the contents of the SD card. So that looked like they did the same firmware update to a different product. That was April 23rd. A month goes by, and Bitdefender thinks, well, okay, let's reserve some CVE numbers for what we will eventually be publishing. So they did that. So that's May.

June, July, August, September, four months. And Wyze released Wyze Cam v2 that happened to fix one of the three CVEs that had been issued, but not the most critical one. So that was September 24th, 2019. Now we move to November 9th, 2020. And the vendor fixed a different one of the CVEs through an app update. The next day, finally, Wyze acknowledges the reception from a year and a half before and assigns an internal contact at Wyze to deal with Bitdefender. Two days later, Bitdefender sends the advisory to them and a proof of concept. Nine months pass. Silence.

On August 31st, 2021, Bitdefender follows up on patch progress. Hello. Is anybody there? September 13th, 2021, so two weeks from August 31st to September 13th. Bitdefender notifies the vendor. Oh, it actually probably was exactly two weeks. They waited. Nothing happened. So they said, okay, we're going to publish. Four and a half months pass, which brings us to January 29th, 2022. Wyze released firmware to fix the unauthenticated access to the contents of the SD card issue, which is one of the biggest problems. Okay. So that was on January 29th. Being again ridiculously responsible, Bitdefender waited 60 days from January 29th to March 29th. On March 29th, they published their report.

I've said it before, and I'm sure this won't be the last time I say it again: There is something fundamentally wrong with the idea, the way we have everything set up today, that an independent security research group must expend this level of effort to not only first reverse engineer and examine a product whose security is critically important to its users, but to then face an utterly unresponsive product publisher and attempt for three years to get them to fix critical flaws in the operation of their surveillance interconnected webcams.

And look at the Catch-22 that Bitdefender is then in. The only way to leverage responsibility from Wyze, to get Wyze to get off the dime, would be to go public with the news and the details of the flaws. But doing so would immediately place all of Wyze's gazillion webcam users at significant risk. And even if details were withheld, from like a partial disclosure by Bitdefender, we've all seen many instances where just telling the bad guys where to look for vulnerabilities is all that's necessary. Those wearing black hats could certainly follow in Bitdefender's footsteps. So Bitdefender had little true choice other than to wait and push and poke and prod and hope that Wyze would eventually open a responsible dialog. Again, they couldn't risk drawing any attention to the Wyze cams because other people could figure out how to exploit them. And the problems were really bad.

And what I loved, it's just rich that Wyze's cybersecurity team, like they have one, finally said they appreciated the responsible disclosure provided by Bitdefender on the vulnerabilities. Yeah, I bet they did. Three years Bitdefender patiently waited because of Bitdefender's ethics. Essentially Wyze had Bitdefender over a barrel.

Okay. So get a load of this truly amazing classic remote connection authentication bypass. It's just the best thing ever. When connecting remotely, a client is required to log onto the camera; right? The camera running a service, so we'll consider it to be the server. The client being a user on a web page or whatever. A client is required to log onto the device. Of course, because you don't want everyone to have access to your webcam, by definition. The client and the webcam share a 128-bit secret key. Okay, that's good security. Webcam has a 128-bit secret key burned into it. The client is required to know it, a pre-shared key. Good security. No problem there.

So the client initiates its connection by sending an IOCTL, an IO Control command, with the ID of its hex, 2710. Upon receiving, the cam will accept a TCP connection. Then the Wyze cam receives this packet with the ID 2710, which induces it to generate a random nonce value which it encrypts with its 128-bit shared secret key. Okay, that's great. It sends the encrypted blob to the client. By the design of this simple protocol, the client must have that same 128-bit shared secret key, which it uses to decrypt the camera's randomly chosen nonce value, which it had then encrypted, to authenticate itself to the camera, which it does by returning the properly decrypted camera nonce using an IOCTL command with the ID 2712 instead of 2710.

So 2710 initiates the handshake, asks the camera to generate a nonce, which encrypts the 128-bit shared secret, sends the encrypted blob back to the client. Client that has the same 128-bit shared secret key decrypts it and then returns it to the camera under the command 2712. The camera receiving the 2712 IOCTL compares the nonce that was hopefully decrypted by the connecting client to the value that it stored locally. And only if they match will the authentication succeed and the connection be accepted. And after that the client is free to do whatever it wishes with the camera. Right? No problem. Simple. Shared secret. Workable protocol.

Here's what the Bitdefender guys found. The way the Wyze firmware works is that upon receiving that initial 2710 command, it generates and stores the nonce for subsequent comparison. And it then encrypts it and sends it to the client. But if the client never sends the 2710 command in the first place, the nonce's value stored in RAM remains set to all zeroes. I just love this.

So all any attacker needs to do to gain full access to any original or only just patched just, what, earlier last month, or any unpatched cam, is to connect and skip issuing the first 2710 command which asks the camera to begin the authentication handshake. Instead, an attacker simply first sends the second 2712 command with an all-zeroes authentication. Since that will always match the camera's default null nonce, anyone can log into anyone's Wyze cam. You can see why Bitdefender said "Holy crap" three years ago.

You can read the full show transcript here:

or you can watch the podcast here:
 

Latest posts

Top Bottom